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Introduction and summary
The vast array of financial regulations in the United
States and other developed economies is justified
largely as a way of protecting the public from the
dangers of systemic risk or systemic crisis in financial
markets. Even the title of a recent General Accounting
Office report on financial derivative regulation (Finan-
cial derivatives: Actions needed to protect the finan-
cial system [GAO, 1994]) and images in the popular
press (a close-up of a snake with jaws wide open on
the cover of Fortune magazine) appeal to our fear of
systemic risk. While many different (and often mutu-
ally contradictory) characterizations of systemic risk
have been proposed, it is somewhat disturbing that
we lack a consensus as to what, precisely, systemic
risk is.
In its most general usage, the term systemic crisis
describes a shock to the financial system that impairs
crucial functions of the system, such as asset valua-
tion, credit allocation, and payments.1 This character-
ization, however, is not too helpful. What sort of mech-
anism can result in this sort of impairment? Economists
do not agree. Proposed answers include: irrational
piling-on of debt;2 moral hazard induced by mispriced
government-provided deposit insurance;3 complex re-
lationships among counterparties;4 an unwillingness
of dealers to trade;5 a failure of the central bank to
provide liquidity as needed;6 unpredictable adverse
shocks that come from outside the financial sector;7
and bank runs.8 Regardless of which characterization
one prefers, a satisfactory theory of systemic risk
requires a fully articulated, internally consistent eco-
nomic model. A rigorous economic model may leave
uncertainty as to how the model maps to reality, but
there can be no uncertainty about what is meant with-
in the context of the model itself.
While economists may disagree as to the causes
and nature of systemic risk, there have been specific
events in history that are generally recognized as
examples of systemic crisis. The most recent such
event is the Asian crisis that began in mid-1997. This
crisis displays certain textbook characteristics gener-
ally associated with systemic crisis: It appeared to
originate in financial markets; it displayed contagion,
with problems in one country seeming to induce crises
in other countries; there was clear evidence of confi-
dence loss by investors; there were substantial real
costs in economic output; and the crisis clearly called
for a policy response. One aspect of the Asian crisis
that is more difficult to explain using standard theo-
ries is that it seemed to emerge almost spontaneous-
ly. Although, with hindsight, one can point to condi-
tions that may have made some East Asian economies
vulnerable to economic disturbance, the crisis was
not forecasted by knowledgeable observers, nor was
it triggered by any shocks commensurate with the
scale of the upheaval.
I argue in this article that the standard neoclas-
sical model commonly used in economic analysis is
poorly suited to explain the sort of crisis in which a
small impulse induces a large change in economic per-
formance. Rather, the Asian crisis is best explained as
an example of coordination failure. Suppose the eco-
nomic performance of a country (or a firm, industry,
or financial market) depends on large numbers of inves-
tors being willing to provide funds. If it is generally
believed that other investors will withhold funds, it is
rational for any given investor to refrain from invest-
ing. Thus, these beliefs become self-fulfilling. This14 Economic Perspectives
represents a coordination failure because everyone
would be better off if all investors provided funds to
the affected country. Unfortunately, there is no way
to coordinate investor actions in this way.
In this article, I formalize this notion of coordina-
tion failure in a simple static model. My model implies
that, as in the DiamondDybvig (1983) model of bank
runs, some credible insurance mechanism is necessary
to avoid costly coordination failure. The U.S. savings
and loan crisis shows the danger of government-
provided insurance without adequate regulatory over-
sight. However, it is not obvious how to establish such
oversight in an international context. The recent events
in Asia suggest that the world community eventually
must face this issue.
The Asian financial crisis
Since a detailed chronology and discussion of
the events surrounding the Asian crisis can be found
elsewhere,9 I summarize only the essential facts in this
article. The years preceding the crisis were a period
of exceptional growth in the East Asian economies.
In the months preceding the crisis, no real macroeco-
nomic distortions were observed. The economies of
the five crisis countries (Thailand, Malaysia, Indone-
sia, South Korea, and the Philippines) were character-
ized by low inflation (less than 10 percent), budgets
generally in surplus, and declining government foreign
debt (as a fraction of gross domestic product [GDP]).
For example, Indonesia experienced 10.4 percent ex-
port growth in the year preceding the crisis, its gov-
ernment budget was in surplus each of the previous
four years, and its current account deficit was only 3
percent to 5 percent of GDP. During the 1990s, these
governments engaged in responsible credit creation
and monetary expansion. Unemployment rates were
low and did not provide an incentive for governments
to engage in currency depreciation or monetary expan-
sion as a short-term stimulus.
However, there were some worrisome signs of
imbalance that, in retrospect, made these economies
vulnerable to crisis. First, the ratio of short-term debt
to short-term assets was high and growing. In partic-
ular, the ratio of short-term debt to foreign exchange
reserves in Thailand, Korea, and Indonesia had exceed-
ed 1.0 since 1994. Radelet and Sachs (1998b) show
that this ratio is positively correlated with systemic
crises, but does not inevitably lead to crisis. In addi-
tion, the crisis was preceded by a large increase in
foreign bank lending. In particular, from yearend 1995
to yearend 1996 foreign bank lending to the five crisis
countries increased by 24 percent, with an additional
10 percent (annualized) increase during the first half
of 1997. Finally, anecdotal evidence suggests that much
of this expanded credit was invested in real estate mar-
kets, rather than increasing productive capacity.
Looking back, it is possible to discern develop-
ments in 1996 and 1997 that may have been unfavor-
able to these Asian economies. For example, Corsetti,
Pesenti, and Roubini (1998) point to a fall in the de-
mand for semiconductors in 1996 and expectations of
contractionary monetary policy in Japan and the U.S.
in spring 1997. However, one can always use hindsight
to point to less-than-perfect business conditions be-
fore a crisis. Without a doubt there were also unfavor-
able developments during the years of unprecedented
growth. Why did they precipitate a crisis this time?
The evidence seems clear that the crisis took the
world completely by surprise. Bond spreads between
emerging market debt (including that of the Asian five)
and U.S. Treasury securities actually fell between
mid-1995 and mid-1997.10 Similarly, syndicated loan
spreads were generally lower in early 1997 than they
had been in 1996. Moodys and S&Ps ratings of sov-
ereign debt gave no indication of an impending crisis.
Long-term sovereign debt ratings for the five crisis
countries remained unchanged throughout 1996 and the
first half of 1997, right up to the onset of the crisis. The
only exception was an upgrade for the Philippines.11
The first events leading to the crisis were failures
of certain large Korean chaebols (industrial conglom-
erates). In January 1997, Hanbo Steel declared bank-
ruptcy. This was particularly significant because it was
the first bankruptcy of a leading Korean conglomerate
in a decade. This was followed in March 1997 with the
failure of another Korean conglomerate, Sammi Steel.
Around the same time, Kia, Koreas third largest auto
maker, had difficulty rolling over its debt. (In July, it
asked for emergency loans.)
Meanwhile, in Thailand, nonbank finance com-
panies suffered under the weight of bad real estate
loans. It was widely thought that the Thai government
would aid these institutions. In February, Samprasong
Land, a finance company, missed payment on its for-
eign debt. On March 10, the Thai government appeared
to state that it would buy up to $3.9 billion in bad
property debt from various finance companies. How-
ever, it reneged. The collapse of Thailands largest
finance company, Finance One, on May 23 provided
explicit evidence that the Thai government would not
bail out investors in these finance companies.
After repeated declarations that the baht would
not be devalued, on July 2 the Bank of Thailand an-
nounced that it would allow the baht to float. The
baht fell by about 1520 percent. Immediately, the
Philippine peso came under attack, followed a few15 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
days later by the Malaysian ringgit. The crisis was
under way. The Indonesian rupiah did not come under
severe pressure until mid-August. (By late January
1998, it had lost 80 percent of its value against the
dollar.) By November, currency weakness had spread
to the Korean won. When the crisis reached its peak,
foreign exchange rates came close to a free fall. On
several trading days in November and December, the
Korean won plunged the limit of its trading range in
the first few minutes of trading. In the first four trading
days of 1998, the Indonesian rupiah hit four consecu-
tive record lows, for a total loss of 27 percent against
the dollar. On January 8, it lost another 26 percent in
a single day.
The crisis soon spread to the stock markets. Dur-
ing four days in mid-October the Hong Kong stock
market lost nearly 25 percent of its value. In early
November, stock markets in Taiwan and South Korea
plunged. Equity markets elsewhere also posted sharp
losses. For example, on May 19 (in apparent response
to the political upheaval in Indonesia), Russian stocks
plunged nearly 12 percent, with equity markets post-
ing smaller declines in Brazil (6.4 percent decline),
Argentina (4.7 percent), and Mexico (3 percent).
Clear evidence of a collapse in investor confidence
can be seen in the dramatic reversal of capital flows.
In 1996, the capital inflow to the five Asian crisis econ-
omies was $93 billion. In 1997, the figure was $12.1
billion, with estimates for 1998 of $9.4 billion.12 The
reversal from 1996 to 1997 represented 11 percent of
the combined GDP of these five countries. Korean
firms had great difficulty raising short-term capital.
Part of the collapse of the Korean stock market was
attributed to selling of shares by cash-short institu-
tions in an effort to raise operating cash. Indeed, at
a meeting of finance ministry officials in November,
U.S. Deputy Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers
stressed that this was not a traditional balance of pay-
ments crisis but fundamentally a crisis of confidence.
Asset and foreign exchange prices seemed to
stabilize in Asia by February 1998. However, the eco-
nomic impact of the crisis continued. South Korea
entered a recession, with a first quarter 1998 decline
in output of 3.8 percent/annum. (The previous years
growth rate was 4.3 percent.). Korean consumer price
inflation was 9 percent in March 1998 (year over year),
compared with 4.5 percent in the previous year. Pro-
ducer prices recorded a more dramatic rise: Korean
producer price inflation was 17.5 percent for the year
ending March 1998 (versus 3.8 percent in the previous
year). The Korean jobless rate in March was 4.7 per-
cent, compared with 2.5 percent a year earlier. A record
high 1.2 million people were unemployed.
The real impact of the crisis in Indonesia was
even worse. By mid-May, the consensus forecast was
for a 1998 economic contraction of 78 percent.
(Indonesias GDP grew at a rate of 5 percent in the
previous year.) The official data showed an April
1997April 1998 inflation rate of 44.9 percent. The
official unemployment estimate was 10 percent, al-
though many analysts regard this as an underestimate.
Nor were other countries spared. First quarter data
for Hong Kong reported a 2 percent GDP contraction,
the first quarterly contraction in Hong Kong in 13
years. The consensus forecast for GDP growth in
Thailand was 6.0 percent, compared with a 2.5 per-
cent expansion in 1997. The full impact of the crisis
has yet to be assessed. There remains a substantial
short-term debt overhang that must be renegotiated.
Characteristics of systemic risk
The Asian crisis exemplifies certain characteris-
tics that are incorporated in most definitions of sys-
temic risk.
A systemic crisis originates in, or is substantially
magnified by, financial markets. More precisely, sys-
temic risk must originate in the process of financing.
That is, the capital needed by a firm is provided by
investors outside the firm. According to this proper-
ty, systemic risk would not be present if all firms were
purely financed internally. This characteristic is clear-
ly present in the Asian crisis. Prior to the crisis, the
macroeconomic foundations were strong, with no large
shocks from outside the financial system.
A systemic crisis involves contagion. Problems
in one country (institution, firm) cause (or appear to
cause) insolvency, distress, or bankruptcy in other,
otherwise healthy, countries (institutions, firms). For
example, the initial business failures in the Asian cri-
sis were in Korea and Thailand, but financial markets
were roiled almost immediately in Malaysia, Philippines,
Indonesia, and Hong Kong, and eventually in Latin
America and Russia.
A systemic crisis involves a loss of confidence by
investors. Usually this means that investors or finan-
cial institutions cut back the amount of liquidity they
are willing to provide. Furthermore, the withdrawal of
liquidity is not due to any objective deterioration in
the quality of the borrower firms but is more a function
of investor sentiment. This problem was apparent in
the rapid reversal of capital flows to East Asia.
A systemic crisis involves substantial real costs
in economic output and/or economic efficiency. For
example, a stock market crash is not necessarily a sys-
temic crisis. If the crash simply redistributes wealth
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when prices were low) to the speculators on the win-
ning side (those who bought low) without affecting
real economic activity, it would not be a systemic cri-
sis. A crisis must hurt Main Street, not just Wall Street.
The Asian crisis is clearly having a huge impact on the
well-being of ordinary citizens.
A systemic crisis calls for a policy response. In
particular, a systemic crisis must result in a subopti-
mal economic performance that, at least in principle,
could be improved by government action. According
to economic theory, government action can be justi-
fied if there is an externality, whereby individuals
do not fully internalize the costs or benefits of their
actions. For example, some economists associate sys-
temic crisis with a wave of bankruptcies (see, for exam-
ple, Feldstein, 1991). If a bankruptcy only affects the
individuals who have a contractual relationship with
the bankrupt firm (such as the shareholders, creditors,
and employees), there is no justification for govern-
ment action. Presumably, the terms of the original
contracts between the firm and these individuals
should have taken the possibility of bankruptcy into
consideration. However, if a wave of bankruptcies
affects individuals with no contractual relationship
with the bankrupt firms (say, because fearful investors
withdraw funds from healthy firms), then these bank-
ruptcies have economy-wide costs that would not
have been considered in the original contracts. In
such cases, there may be scope for government ac-
tion. More generally, if a particular characterization
of systemic risk does not imply lost economic effi-
ciency, and therefore the possibility of corrective
policy action, it would not be particularly useful for
regulatory purposes.
There is one additional characteristic that the
Asian crisis has in common with many other systemic
crisesthe lack of a clear triggering event. There
were obvious structural problems in the East Asian
crisis economies, including a high reliance on exter-
nal capital, a poorly developed banking system (with
an even less well developed regulatory apparatus),
cronyism between the financial sector and high-rank-
ing government officials, and a lack of transparency
in the workings of financial institutions. However, all
of these problems were well known before the crisis,
and foreign investors were perfectly willing to provide
capital when these economies were performing very
well. What happened to shatter their confidence so
dramatically and so quickly? If there was a precipitat-
ing event, the economic response seems wholly dis-
proportionate to the size of the triggering shock.
Neither the 1929 nor the 1987 stock market crash
had an obvious precipitating event (in contrast to the
sharp market declines in fall of 1973 and 1980, which
were caused by OPECs announcement of its oil em-
bargo and the fall from power of the Shah of Iran,
respectively). Similarly, the 1992 crisis in the Europe-
an exchange rate mechanism and the recent Mexican
crisis did not have clear triggers. In the case of the
Asian crisis, foreign exchange traders might argue that
there was a clear trigger: a run on the Thai currency.
However, a run on the currency is simply a visible
expression of a loss of confidence, so the question
of what caused the dramatic drop in investor confi-
dence remains.
Why did the crisis happen?
Below, I list some proposed explanations for the
Asian crisis in increasing order of plausibility. First,
it is tempting to blame rapacious foreign exchange
speculators. (This was the theme of Malaysian
Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamads well-publicized
tirade against U.S. financier George Soros.) Certainly,
speculative attacks on the currency of a crisis coun-
try are often the first visible evidence that a crisis is
underway. However, the dramatic falls in foreign ex-
change values were actually a symptom rather than a
cause of the crisis. According to Paul Krugman, the
currency crises were only part of a broader financial
crisis, which had very little to do with currencies or
even monetary issues per se (Krugman, 1998). If
investors doubt the profitability of investments in a
particular country, they will start withdrawing capital.
This reversal of capital flows causes foreign exchange
rates to collapse. Of course, astute currency specula-
tors may foresee such a reversal and bet against the
currency. However, the causality runs from the percep-
tion of declining profitability to the collapse of currency
markets, not vice versa.
A second theory, outlined in a recent publication
of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development,13 attributes the Asian crisis to excessive
optimism, throughout the region itself and in financial
institutions in Europe, North America, and Japan;
insufficient weighting of downside risks; a tenden-
cy toward overheating; and excessive concentra-
tions of capital in particular areas. These words imply
investor irrationality. There is a long history of explain-
ing systemic risk in this way. Kindleberger (1978), Min-
sky (1982), and Feldstein (1991) attribute systemic risk
to an irrational piling-on of debt. According to this
explanation, firms become overly optimistic about their
debt capacity during expansions. They finance capi-
tal investment with ever-increasing leverage ratios.
Eventually, this debt level becomes unsustainable,
leading to an inevitable collapse: Greed overcomes17 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
fear and individual investors take greater risks in pur-
suit of greater returns. A shock occurs and the market
prices of assets begin to collapse. Bankruptcies ...
follow. ... The resulting failure of the payments mech-
anism and the inability to create credit bring on an
economic collapse (Feldstein, 1991).
I regard theories based on investor irrationality
to be methodologically unsound. While investors do
not always behave rationally, it is too easy to ascribe
anomalous events to pervasive and systematic mis-
takes by investors who clearly have every incentive
to avoid such mistakes. However, even if one were to
accept this idea in principle, the policy implications
are not credible: Presumably the government should
impose regulations to keep these exuberant firms from
over-leveraging. In other words, the firms whose mon-
ey is at stake cannot determine the proper level of
debt, but government bureaucrats can.
A third theory, however, provides an explanation
for excessive debt that is completely consistent with
investor rationality: the problem of moral hazard in-
duced by a mispriced government-provided safety
net. Moral hazard arises whenever an insured party,
by virtue of being insured, fails to take precautions
to prevent the event being insured against. In finan-
cial markets, moral hazard can arise if investors or
bank depositors believe that the government will bail
them out if their investments (or the bank) fail. They
have less incentive to monitor the firms or banks to
ensure that these institutions make prudent decisions.
In particular, they lend more than they would in the
absence of the government guarantee.
Under this explanation, systemic risk is a state
of overleveraging due to the existence of the safety
net, and systemic crises occur when, due to an
external adverse shock, there are excessive defaults
(relative to the number of defaults one would expect
in the absence of the safety net). In the context of the
Asian crisis, foreign investors may have believed
that they would be protected by Asian governments
(and perhaps ultimately by the International Monetary
Fund [IMF]) in the event of a crisis. As a result, lend-
ers were less diligent in monitoring their borrowers
than they would have been if they did not anticipate
a bailout, and the quality of investment projects cho-
sen was poorer with higher levels of risk.
It is easy to demonstrate that an investment project
is poor once the project fails. However, for a proper
test of the moral hazard hypothesis, one needs to
show that, before the failure, investors exercised less
diligence than they should have in making their in-
vestment choices. This is a far more difficult exercise.
Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (1998) cite evidence
that investment quality was low: A substantial frac-
tion of the new investment was directed toward real
estate, as opposed to increased manufacturing capacity.
The rate of nonperforming loans before the crisis was
above 15 percent in Thailand, Korea, Indonesia, and
Malaysia. In 1996, 20 of the 30 largest Korean conglom-
erates showed a rate of return on invested capital
below the cost of capital. While certainly not defini-
tive, these patterns are consistent with a lack of pru-
dence on the part of investors.
The moral hazard hypothesis can explain why ra-
tional foreign investors might lend short term to finance
long-term risky projects. Furthermore, it is consistent
with the view that the Asian crisis was triggered by
the Thai governments unwillingness to bail out failed
finance companies. However, it still cant account for
the rapid reversal in capital flows. Did news casting
doubt on implicit guarantees arrive so fast that inves-
tors executed a 180-degree reversal in a matter of days?
In the standard model, a gradual inflow of adverse
news would induce gradual change in the optimal level
of investment. This is not what happened in Asia.
This lack of a triggering event commensurate
with the scale of the crisis presents a real challenge
to theorists. In the standard model, there is a unique
fundamental value of a firm: the present value of
the net cash flow generated by the firm. The market
value of the firm should be the best guess, given cur-
rent information, about this fundamental value. Simi-
larly, the unique fundamental value of a national econ-
omy is the present value of the cash flow generated
by the total economic activity of that country. A coun-
trys currency represents a claim to the current and/or
future output of that countrys economy. The value
of this currency should in some sense reflect the fun-
damental value of the countrys productive capacity.
A sudden, precipitous drop in the value of a countrys
asset markets or currency would then mean that:
n The markets pre-crisis assessment of fundamental
value was too high; or
n The markets post-crisis assessment of fundamen-
tal value was too low; or
n The crisis was precipitated by the arrival of new in-
formation that caused rational investors to change
their assessment of this fundamental value.
If, as seems to be the case in many financial crises,
the third alternative is difficult to sustain, the stan-
dard model forces one to choose between the first
and second alternatives, both of which imply serious
valuation errors by investors. Otherwise, one must
abandon the standard model in favor of one in which
there is no unique fundamental value.18 Economic Perspectives
In the next section, I describe a simple
model that, unlike the standard model, ad-
mits multiple fully rational equilibria, with a
different fundamental value associated with
each equilibrium. I interpret one of these
equilibria as a systemic crisis. In principle,
a very small impulse can trigger a shift from
the good equilibrium to the crisis equilibri-
um, with large consequences for economic
performance.
Coordination failure, self-fulfilling
prophecies, and systemic risk
A simple model of coordination failure
Here, I propose an approach to sys-
temic risk that builds on Diamond and
Dybvigs (1983) idea of coordination
failure. In my approach, the fundamental
value of a firm or a national economy
depends on the state of investor confi-
dence. A formal statement of the model is in technical
appendix 1. Suppose a countrys economy consists
of a large number of identical firms. In the standard
model, the output of a firm (or industry, or country)
displays decreasing returns to scale. That is, as the
scale of production grows, the additional output
resulting from one additional unit of productive in-
puts (labor, land, capital) decreases. Figure 1 displays
these decreasing returns to scale. (For simplicity, the
figure has only a single input, which I refer to as
working capital, denoted L, for liquidity.) To see
why economists make this decreasing returns to
scale assumption, consider what would happen if a
competitive firm operated where increasing
returns prevailed: The firm could always
make higher profits by increasing its scale
of production, since its revenues would in-
crease faster than its costs. Thus, a profit-
maximizing competitive firm would never
operate where increasing returns to scale
prevail. Furthermore, as long as there are
productive inputs such as land or physical
capital that are fixed, at least in the short
run, then a high enough output level will
be in the decreasing returns range.
While this story is plausible, nothing
suggests that a firms production function
must have decreasing returns to scale for
all levels of inputs. In figure 2, there are
increasing returns to the scale of produc-
tion as long as working capital is less than
the level designated L*. Below this level,
efficiencies can be captured by increasing
the scale of production. For working capital greater
than L*, returns to scale decrease, as in figure 1.
For the simple model, I use a rather extreme ver-
sion of increasing returns followed by decreasing
returns, as displayed in figure 3. L* is a fixed set-up
cost for the firm. If working capital is less than L*, the
firm cannot be completely set up, so production
equals zero. If working capital exceeds L*, the firm
produces according to a production function similar
to that in figure 1. (All the intuitive results go through
with the more general function in figure 2. I use the
production function in figure 3 for convenience.)
FIGURE 1
Example of decreasing returns to scale
working capital
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Now, I make two critical assumptions. The first is
that inputs must be financed externally.14 That is, the
firm cannot provide its own working capital but must
borrow from investors. As is typical in models of this
type, the return to lenders (denoted r) equals the mar-
ginal product of working capital (the additional output
produced by one additional unit of working capital).
The marginal product corresponding to the produc-
tion function in figure 3 is given in figure 4. Let us
assume that investors have a choice of assets. They
can lend working capital to the firm described by fig-
ures 3 and 4 or they can invest in a safe low-return
investment, paying a gross return of 1.0.
This return is the black line in figure 4. I
also assume that, for any feasible level of
working capital greater than L*, the return
r exceeds 1.0. (Note that the marginal
product schedule in figure 4 lies above
the black line whenever working capital
exceeds L*.) If total working capital per
firm exceeds L*, then every investor would
prefer to invest in working capital loans
rather than investing in the low-return
asset. Of course, if total working capital
per firm is less than L*, the return to work-
ing capital loans is zero, so the low-return
asset is preferable.
The second critical assumption gives
rise to the possibility of coordination fail-
ure. I assume that the minimum financing
requirement of any given firm is too big
for any individual investor to provide. It
requires a large number of investors. What does that
imply for an individual investor? If an investor is con-
fident that a sufficient number of other individual in-
vestors will lend sufficient working capital to the firm
to meet its minimum requirement, it would be optimal
for the investor in question to lend as well. If all inves-
tors think this way, the aggregate working capital will
exceed the minimum requirement, the return on the in-
vestment will be greater than 1.0, and the investors
investment decisions are indeed justified. This is the
high output equilibrium. In this equilibrium, the opti-
mal strategy for all investors is to put all their invest-
able wealth in working capital for the
firm, receiving a return r that exceeds 1.0.
However, there is another equilibrium
with an output of zero. If the individual
investor believes that the number of oth-
er investors is insufficient to provide the
threshold level of working capital, it is op-
timal for the investor to refrain entirely
from investing in working capital, and to
use the alternative, low-return investment.
If all investors think this way, liquidity
equals zero, so the return to the lender
also equals zero, and, again, the inves-
tors investment decisions are justified
ex post. Note that both equilibria are fully
rational: in neither case do investors have
any incentive to deviate from their cho-
sen investment strategy.
 To establish the first equilibrium,
(the high-output equilibrium) all that is
needed is to have enough investors
FIGURE 3
































agree to invest all their wealth in the firm. If this could
be done, then the market return on working capital
loans would exceed unity, and the remaining investors
would also invest in the firm. This second equilibrium
corresponds to a systemic crisis. It represents a failure
of coordination, since all investors would benefit if
they could coordinate their actions and invest in the
firm. The only explanation for the low-output result is
that each investor believes that other investors do
not want to invest. In other words, there is a pervasive
lack of confidence in the ability of the financial markets
to provide sufficient capital to the firm. This state of
affairs recalls Keyness characterization of the stock
market as betting on a beauty contest. What is im-
portant is not the state of the firms technology. (In
this example, the firms technology is the same in
both equilibria and is known to all investors.) Rather,
what is important is the investors beliefs about what
the other investors will do. Note that, in this model,
there are no bubbles, whereby market values devi-
ate from fundamental value. Rather, the true fundamen-
tal value of the firm depends on the state of investor
confidence.
To apply this model to the Asian crisis, I interpret
the firm in the model as a developing country in
need of dollar working capital loans, the investors
as large western commercial banks, and the alterna-
tive low-return investment as western treasury secu-
rities. In the high-output equilibrium, sufficient work-
ing capital is provided to the developing country for
it to produce at a high level. In the crisis equilibrium,
western investors refuse to provide working capital,
and the output of the developing country falls precipi-
tously.15 Under this interpretation, the model can cap-
ture the sudden exchange rate disruption that typical-
ly accompanies international systemic crises like the
recent Asian crisis. Assuming that purchasing power
parity holds and both the money supply and velocity
are constant in both countries, it is easy to show that
the exchange rate is proportional to the ratio of the
real output of the developing country to the real out-
put of the western country. The crisis equilibrium
(where the output of the developing country falls to
zero) is then associated with a precipitous fall in the
exchange rate.
This model can be interpreted as representing
other types of systemic risk. If the firms are banks, the
crisis equilibrium is one where households withdraw
liquidity from the banking system. This does not nec-
essarily correspond to a bank run in Diamond and
Dybvigs (1983) sense. If the depositors withdraw
liquidity from the banking system (as in the Great
Depression, when the money multiplier fell to a
historically low value), banks need not fail as a result.
They may be able to accommodate the withdrawals
by calling existing loans and refusing to make addi-
tional loans. Nonetheless, this economy-wide flight
to currency will starve the productive sector of need-
ed liquidity, and the resulting business failures even-
tually will take their toll on the banking sector.
One can also interpret the model as a payment
system. In this interpretation, the threshold liquidity
level L* for an institution is the amount of liquidity
it needs to avoid default and possible bankruptcy.
Suppose an institution counts on receiving cash
flow during the day in excess of L* and, due to a dis-
ruption in the payments system, it does not receive
this cash flow. Other institutions act as the investors
in the model. They will only provide the needed
loans to the stricken institution if they believe the
total loan provision will exceed L*. Many specialist
firms on the New York Stock Exchange were in this
position the day after the October 1987 crash. Spe-
cialist firms had purchased stock during the crash
(performing their designated role as market maker).
The amount of credit they needed to settle these
trades at the end of the day corresponds to L* in
the model. Banks only provided this credit if they
thought that enough other banks were participating
to insure that the specialist firm would not end up
in bankruptcy court, with the attendant costs and
delays. Coordination failure in this case was avoided
by the active intervention of the government and the
Federal Reserve.
Modeling the stock market: A dynamic model
The simple model in the previous section did
not account for the declines in asset markets that
were a prominent part of the Asian crisis. To incor-
porate a stock market into the simple model, I incor-
porate the simple model into a dynamic economic
equilibrium. A formal statement of this model is in
technical appendix 2. In this model, stock shares are
thought of as claims to the firms physical capital. The
price of a claim (that is, the price per share) must
represent the present value of the future dividends
accruing to the owner of the claim. However, the div-
idend in any given period depends on the amount of
working capital provided by external investors. That
is, it depends on which equilibrium prevails that
period. As a result, the current stock price is a func-
tion of the probability that a systemic crisis (the bad
equilibrium) will occur in the future. If this probability
increases, the stock price falls.16 Furthermore, if the
future systemic crisis in question is expected in the
near term, the stock price falls by more than if this21 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
crisis is expected in the more remote future. In other
words, current stock values forecast the probability
of future systemic crises. Note that the declines in
Asian asset markets started before the actual onset
of the crisis. (See Krugman, 1998.)
Contagion
The model developed thus far captures a number
of the key features of systemic risk. Systemic crises are
associated with a sudden withdrawal of liquidity (work-
ing capital) from productive firms due to a loss of con-
fidence that seems unrelated to the state of technology.
After the fact, this withdrawal of working capital loans
seems to indicate an over-reliance on debt, in the
sense that a firm would avoid this problem if it could
avoid dependence on outside lenders for working
capital. There are real costs in economic efficiency to
the crisis of confidence associated with the low-out-
put state, suggesting a possible role for government
action to bolster investor confidence. Finally, agents
in the model are completely rational. Every agent in
the economy acts optimally, given the actions of the
other agents and the inability to coordinate.
However, the one element that has not been incor-
porated into this model is contagion: the tendency
for the failure of one institution to precipitate a crisis
of confidence that harms unrelated firms and leads to
reduced economic activity. Most discussions of con-
tagion involve cascading defaults. As well as hav-
ing direct exposure to the credit-worthiness of its
direct counterparties, an institution has indirect expo-
sure to the credit-worthiness of its counterparties
counterparties and so on. As a result, it is vulnerable
to disruptions caused by the failure of institutions to
which it has no direct exposure. However, properly
understood, this notion of contagion is ordinary credit
risk. Know thy counterparty requires an assessment
of all factors that could impair the counterpartys
credit-worthiness, including its exposure to other
firms distress. The fact that a bank may have incom-
plete information about its counterparties exposure
to other institutions does not change this conclusion.
Incomplete information is always associated with
risk. Institutions should manage the risk associated
with these information gaps in the same way they
manage other types of risk.
Here, I consider an alternative notion of contagion:
The failure of a firm provides information about the
state of investor confidence. As defaults are observed,
the investor community cannot tell whether these are
purely due to company-specific weaknesses or to
individual investors pulling the plug. The default
thus may give information that the economy is ready
to shift to the bad equilibrium.
To formalize this idea of contagion, I put the sim-
ple model developed earlier into a richer context. Recall
that the critical determinant of whether a systemic cri-
sis occurs is L, the aggregate level of working capital.
In the simple model, L is observed by all investors.
Suppose instead that L is not observable. Investors
then must decide on how much working capital to
provide based on their best estimate of the state of
economy-wide confidence, as summarized by L. Any
information that causes investors to lower this esti-
mate will increase the estimated probability of systemic
crisis and decrease the amount of working capital pro-
vided by investors.
One important piece of information with an obvi-
ous relevance to estimating L is the failure of an indi-
vidual firm. (Recall that the Asian crisis was preceded
by failures of Korean chaebols and Thai finance com-
panies.) In the context of the simple model, a firm fails
if its working capital falls short of L*, the threshold
level. Suppose each firm has a different threshold
level of working capital. I refer to a firms threshold
working capital requirement as its technology. Firm
technology is not observable to investors. All that
investors know is the distribution of threshold levels
across firms. Since all firms look alike to investors,
each firm simply receives the economy-wide average
working capital level. A firm can fail for one of two
reasons: either it has an unusually high threshold
working capital requirement or the economy-wide level
of working capital is unusually low. If the former expla-
nation is true, the bankruptcy has no implications for
future systemic crises. The problem is idiosyncratic to
the firm and does not reflect a weakness in investor
confidence. If, however, the latter explanation is true,
the bankruptcy is evidence that investor confidence
is low. The probability of systemic crisis is now higher.
Unfortunately, our investor cannot tell which explana-
tion holds. The investor must solve a signal extrac-
tion problem, attempting to glean information about
the state of aggregate investor confidence from the
ambiguous news that a particular firm has failed.
In technical appendix 3, I formalize this intuition.
I show how the observation of a firm bankruptcy
causes investors to lower their estimate of aggregate
investor confidence (as measured by L). If, as is plau-
sible, investors willingness to roll over short-term
loans depends on this estimate, the provision of short-
term capital will indeed fall following a bankruptcy.
However, the amount of this fall depends critically
on the investors beliefs before the bankruptcy is
observed. If investors believe that aggregate confi-
dence is strong, observing a single bankruptcy does
little to change this opinion. If, however, investors22 Economic Perspectives
are less certain that other investors will provide suffi-
cient working capital to firms, a single bankruptcy
could cause investors to substantially revise their
beliefs about the magnitude of aggregate investor
confidence. In principle, this could induce investors
to reduce the amount of working capital provided to
firms and induce nonproductivity (bankruptcy) in
firms that would have been solvent had no bankrupt-
cy been observed. That is, a single bankruptcy could
tip the economy into systemic crisis.
Note that the source of contagion is not that one
firms bankruptcy directly puts pressure on other
firms (as in the cascading defaults story). Neither is
the source of contagion that a bankruptcy conveys
information about the state of other firms technology.
Rather, the bankruptcy gives evidence about the be-
liefs of the other investors. A bankruptcy tells inves-
tors that other investors may be less confident than
previously thought. Applying this logic to the Asian
crisis, the failure of Korean chaebols and Thai finance
companies may have induced declines in Indonesian
equity and currency markets not because it gave in-
formation about the state of the Indonesian economy
per se, but because it gave information about the will-
ingness of western investors to lend to Asian emerging
economies. In equilibrium, of course, the willingness
to lend has profound implications for the performance
of these economies.
Conclusion
The framework I have sketched for understand-
ing systemic risk presents a difficult task for policy-
makers. The framework suggests that systemic crises
of the Asian type must be seen as a problem of coor-
dination failure among investors. That is, it is optimal
for individual investors to withhold liquidity from the
stricken countries, yet all investors would be better
off if everyone provided this liquidity. One way around
this coordination failure is to induce a single large
investor to provide the needed liquidity. This was
the solution to the Mexican crisis of 1995. The single
large investor, of course, was the U.S. government.
The Mexican government owed $28 billion in dollar-
denominated notes (tesobonos), but had only $10 bil-
lion in dollar reserves. Thus, the Mexican government
was illiquid. Did this indicate insolvency? Clearly not,
since the $28 billion represented only 10 percent of the
Mexican GDP. There was enough potential economic
output to service this debt. Yet, no private creditors
would roll over the debt. The logic is precisely that
of coordination failure. The solution was for the U.S.
government to take over the debt, thereby eliminating
the problem of coordination. The U.S. government
was repaid on schedule.
A somewhat similar solution is to have a single
large private investor provide the needed liquidity to
individual firms in the crisis countries. If a viable firm
is starved for liquidity and, as a result, has its equity
underpriced, this should represent a buying opportu-
nity for some large investor. We see some evidence
that this is happening in Asia. GE Capital, an Ameri-
can non-bank financial company, has been taking
advantage of low Asian equity values to acquire
Asian companies at fire-sale prices. As of early June
1998, its acquisitions include Japanese and Philippine
life insurance firms and several Thai finance companies.
One analyst forecasts that GE Capital will spend at
least $20 billion on Asian acquisitions over the next
three years.17 Presumably, GE Capital has access to
the needed working capital to make these acquisitions
productive. Policies that help facilitate acquisition of
troubled firms by large, cash-rich institutions could,
in principle, offset the problem of coordination failure.
However, these mechanisms cannot reliably in-
sure against the possibility of systemic crisis. Perhaps
the international community should consider some-
thing more formal. Within a domestic economy, the
way out of the coordination dilemma is to designate
a government institution (usually the central bank)
as backup provider of liquidity in the event of a crisis.
To control the problem of moral hazard, this institution
is given broad regulatory powers over the domestic
financial services industry. (In the U.S. banking indus-
try, the problem of moral hazard is controlled by im-
posing capital adequacy requirements and requiring
prompt corrective action should a bank become un-
dercapitalized.)
However, no such institution exists for interna-
tional transactions. Perhaps the legacy of the Asian
crisis will be to encourage the international community
to consider establishing a backup provider of liquidity
for international liabilities. Such an institution would
have to be given regulatory oversight, with the capacity
to set and monitor capital levels of borrowing institu-
tions and the ability to take prompt corrective action.18
This new institution would set up a source of liquidity
ex ante (well before any crisis), available to countries
that agree to suitable financial reforms including
greater transparency. The institution would need to
be able to commit credibly not to intervene in a crisis
unless it had established a prior arrangement with the
affected country granting it the needed regulatory
oversight. Note that the IMF is not structured in this
way. It was created as a source of liquidity to help
countries adhere to the fixed exchange rates mandated
by the Bretton Woods agreements of 1944. Since the
demise of Bretton Woods, the IMF has functioned as23 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
a source of foreign exchange to be loaned to troubled
countries on an ad hoc basis. It has no ex ante regu-
latory authority, and it does not act according to pre-
set predictable rules.
Why would any sovereign country voluntarily
cede regulatory authority to an international body?
Quite simply, to reassure potential lenders that a
TECHNICAL APPENDIX 1
A simple, static model
There are two periods. Agents have perfect foresight.
There are N identical firms, which behave competi-
tively, and there are N identical investors (where N is
a large number). Each investor is endowed in period
1 with y units of wealth. In this model, it is important
that a firm cannot be productive unless many different
investors invest in that firm. For simplicity, I assume
that investors cannot invest in individual firms. Rather,
all invested funds from the N investors are pooled
and divided among the N firms equally. In the follow-
ing, all quantities are expressed as per-household or
per-firm magnitudes.
Production
A firm has a fixed quantity of physical capital K. It
needs working capital in order to produce. It is assumed
that the firm has no internal sources of working capital,
so it must borrow working capital from investors.
Output = F(K,L),  where
K = physical capital per firm
L = working capital (liquidity) per firm.
It is assumed that there is a threshold amount of
working capital needed to make the firm productive.
This amount, denoted L*, must be paid up front. If
the threshold is not met, the firm produces zero output.















where f is a non-increasing-returns-to-scale produc-
tion function satisfying
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Let r denote the rental rate on working capital.


















To ensure that r always exceeds unity (the return
to storage, described below) whenever L ³ L*, I as-
sume that
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Investors
Each investor has two investment options:
1) lend wealth to the firm to provide working capital,
receiving a gross rate of return r; or 2) invest in a
storage technology that pays a gross return of unity.
The investor only consumes in the second peri-
od. The consumption of the ith investor (denoted ci)
satisfies
ci = rLi + y  Li,
where Li denotes the amount of wealth invested by
investor i in working capital loans. Assume that
L* < y, so there is sufficient wealth in the economy to
pay the firms threshold capital requirement. The ith
investor solves the utility maximization problem
maxUr L y L ii
Li y () .
[, ] +-
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credible lender of last resort in foreign reserves stands
ready to step in should a systemic crisis erupt.19  A
credible structure of this kind would rule out the crisis
equilibrium. It would also make it difficult for an emerg-
ing economy to secure international loans without
committing to the institutions regulatory oversight.24 Economic Perspectives
TECHNICAL APPENDIX 2
























If N is sufficiently large, there are two equilibria:
1. Li = y,    i, r = fL(K,y  L*) > 1;
2. Li = 0,    i, r = 0.
A dynamic model
The basic model in technical appendix 1 is incorporated
into an overlapping generations structure. Each inves-
tor lives two periods and consumes in the second
period only. In the first period of life, the investor
receives an endowment of y units of wealth and can
invest this wealth in three types of assets: 1) lend
wealth to the firm to provide working capital in the
current period, receiving a gross rate of return r (paid
in the following period); 2) invest in shares of stock,
which give the investor a claim to the profits of the
firm in the following period; or 3) invest in a storage
technology that pays a gross return of unity in the
following period. The first period budget constraint is:
5) Lt + ptet + st = y,
where et = number of shares of stock purchased at
date t by the typical young investor, pt = stock price,
st = wealth invested in the storage technology at date
t by the typical young investor, and Lt = working cap-
ital provided at date t by the typical young investor.
In the second period of life, the investor receives:
1) the earnings from working capital investments the
previous period; plus 2) the dividends from her stock-
holding; plus 3) the proceeds from selling her stock
to the current young investors at the current market
price; plus 4) whatever was invested in the storage
technology. The second period budget constraint is:
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where rt is the return to working capital loans at
date t, and dt is the dividend per share at date t,
which is given by:
7) dt = F(K,Lt)  rtLt .
Substituting equation 5 into equation 6, evalu-
ating both at equality, one obtains
8) ct+1 = et(d t+1 + pt+1   pt) + Lt(rt  1) + y
For simplicity, assume that the investor is risk






subject to equation 8 and the following short-sale
restrictions:
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The total number of shares of stock per investor
is normalized to unity, so
11) et = 1.
The KuhnTucker conditions for the maximiza-
tion problem (equations 810), along with the mar-
ket clearing condition (equation 11) imply the fol-
lowing characterization of the stock price pt:











The first is the high-output equilibrium. All in-
vestors, seeing a market return to working capital
loans that exceeds the alternative return of unity, in-
vest all their wealth in loans to the firm. The output
per investor is f(K,y  L*) > y. The second equilibrium
is the low-output equilibrium.  All investors, seeing a
market return to working capital loans equal to zero,
invest all their wealth in the storage technology that
pays a gross return of unity. The output per investor
is simply y (the output of the storage technology).
A
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Equation 12 and the top part of equation 13 sim-
ply say that the current stock price equals the dis-
counted future stock payoff per share dt+1 + pt+1 (al-
though the discount rate depends on whether Lt
equals or exceeds zero). The case represented by the
bottom part of equation 13 must be considered be-
cause the short-sale restrictions on st and Lt preclude
a levered stock portfolio.
Equations 12 and 13 can be solved forward re-
cursively to imply that the current stock price pt is the






















































An example of contagion
The example below illustrates how the failure of
an individual firm can change investors estimates of
the aggregate confidence level of the economy. In
this example, there is a continuum of firms, indexed
by j. The firms differ in their threshold working capital
requirement, denoted L*
j. A firms value of L*
j is un-
known to the investors. As a result, investors treat all
firms alike, and the same amount of working capital
(denoted L) is provided to each firm. Variable L sum-
marizes the state of aggregate investor confidence.
Finally, it is common knowledge that the cross-sec-
tional distribution of L*
j is uniform over [0, q  ], where
q  is a strictly positive parameter.
At the beginning of the first period, the ith in-
vestor has a prior belief that L has a uniform distribu-
tion on [0,li], where li is a positive parameter. In prin-
ciple, li can differ across investors. After L is
determined, but before production takes place, a sin-
gle firm is selected at random to be audited. If  L < L*
j
for this firm, the auditor makes a public announce-
ment that a bankruptcy has occurred. Let B denote
an indicator variable for the event of bankruptcy, so
this announcement corresponds to B = 1. If L  ³   qj,
the auditor announces that no bankruptcy has oc-
curred, in which case B = 0. The investors then up-
date their prior beliefs about L using the realization of
B. In a fully specified version of this model, the in-
vestor would be permitted to withdraw working capi-
tal from the firm after observing B, but before produc-
tion takes place. In this way, the realization of B could
affect the actual amount of working capital available to
firms. However, here I only discuss how investors up-
date their beliefs about L after observing the realiza-











where I use the following notation:














T   denotes the first date after t when both Lt = 0
and st = 0.
Note the dependence in equation 14 of pt on pt(t),
for t > t. If investors assessment of the probability of
a future crisis increases (that is, pt(t) goes down for
some future dates t), then the stock price pt declines.
This effect is more pronounced if the crisis is expected
in the near term, since pt(t) is discounted by the pre-
vailing short-term investment rate compounded from
t to t. The stock market thus becomes an early warn-
ing signal of the market consensus probability of
future crises of confidence.26 Economic Perspectives
so this investors expected value of L is ½li. Using
Bayess Rule, one can derive the corresponding pos-
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Note the chain of first-order stochastic domi-
nance: For any L,
prob prob prob ( ~ )( ~)( ~ ). LL B LL LL B <= > < > <= 10
That is, the event of a bankruptcy shifts probability
mass to the lower tail of the distribution of L, while
the event of no bankruptcy shifts probability mass to
the upper tail. Furthermore, the amount of this shift in
probability mass is non-decreasing in li: a higher val-
ue of li implies a bigger revision of the prior distribu-
tion when B is revealed.
The ith investors expected value of L, condi-



























































As expected, the mean value of L conditional on
B = 0 exceeds the unconditional mean, which in turn
exceeds the mean conditional on B = 1. That is, if no
bankruptcy occurs in period 1, investors increase
their estimate of the level of investor confidence. If a
bankruptcy is reported in period 1, they decrease
their estimate of the confidence level.
NOTES
1Recently, several efforts have been made to catalogue the
various proposed characterizations of systemic risk, along
with the related (and equally ambiguous) notions of financial
fragility and financial bubbles.  Among these are Davis
(1992), a collection of essays edited by Kaufman (1995), and
a special issue of the Journal of Financial Services Research
(Benston et al. 1995).
2See Minsky (1982), Kindleberger (1978), and Feldstein (1991).
3See Benston and Kaufman (1995), Krugman (1998), and
Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (1998).
4See Bank for International Settlements (1990) and Eisenbeis
(1995).
5See U.S. General Accounting Office (1994).
6Schwartz (1986)
7See Benston and Kaufman (1995), Meltzer (1982), and
Crockett (1995).
8Diamond and Dybvig (1983).
9See Radelet and Sachs (1998a,b) and Corsetti, Pesenti, and
Roubini (1998). A detailed chronology of the events in Asia
can be found on the Web site maintained by Nouriel Roubini,
Internet at http://www.stern.nyu.edu/~nroubini/asia.
10See Cline and Barnes (1997).
11See Radelet and Sachs (1998a).
12See Institute of International Finance (1998).
13Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(1998), p. 9.
14One could weaken this assumption to a substantial fraction
of inputs requires external financing.
15This working capital shortage in the Asian crisis was profound.
For example, the Financial Times of March 11, 1998, reported
that the Indonesian poultry industry was in dire straits due to
an insufficiency of foreign exchange needed to purchase im-
ported chicken feed.27 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
16A formal statement of this relationship is in equation 14 of
technical appendix 2.
17See The Economist (1998), pp. 7277.
18A proposal along these lines was recently made by Mishkin
(1998).  Similar proposals were made by Marcus Noland in his
statement before House International Relations Committee
Subcommittees on Asian and Pacific Affairs and International
Economic Policy and Trade on February 3, 1998, and by Soros
(1997).
19There is an analogy with countries such as Argentina that
establish currency boards, thereby relinquishing the right to
conduct monetary policy. They are willing to do so in order to
reassure investors that the government wont expropriate
earnings via high inflation.
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